CHAPTER 22

FIREWALLS

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The function of a strong position is to make the forces holding it practically unassailable.

—*On War*, Carl Von Clausewitz

On the day that you take up your command, block the frontier passes, destroy the official tallies, and stop the passage of all emissaries.

—*The Art of War*, Sun Tzu

**KEY POINTS**

- A firewall forms a barrier through which the traffic going in each direction must pass. A firewall security policy dictates which traffic is authorized to pass in each direction.
- A firewall may be designed to operate as a filter at the level of IP packets, or may operate at a higher protocol layer.

Firewalls can be an effective means of protecting a local system or network of systems from network-based security threats while at the same time affording access to the outside world via wide area networks and the Internet.

### 22.1 THE NEED FOR FIREWALLS

Information systems in corporations, government agencies, and other organizations have undergone a steady evolution. The following are notable developments:

- Centralized data processing system, with a central mainframe supporting a number of directly connected terminals
- Local area networks (LANs) interconnecting PCs and terminals to each other and the mainframe
- Premises network, consisting of a number of LANs, interconnecting PCs, servers, and perhaps a mainframe or two
- Enterprise-wide network, consisting of multiple, geographically distributed premises networks interconnected by a private wide area network (WAN)
- Internet connectivity, in which the various premises networks all hook into the Internet and may or may not also be connected by a private WAN

Internet connectivity is no longer optional for organizations. The information and services available are essential to the organization. Moreover, individual users within the organization want and need Internet access, and if this is not provided via their LAN, they will use dial-up capability from their PC to an Internet service provider (ISP). However, while Internet access provides benefits to the organization,
it enables the outside world to reach and interact with local network assets. This creates a threat to the organization. While it is possible to equip each workstation and server on the premises network with strong security features, such as intrusion protection, this may not be sufficient and in some cases is not cost-effective. Consider a network with hundreds or even thousands of systems, running various operating systems, such as different versions of UNIX and Windows. When a security flaw is discovered, each potentially affected system must be upgraded to fix that flaw. This requires scaleable configuration management and aggressive patching to function effectively. While difficult, this is possible and is necessary if only host-based security is used. A widely accepted alternative or at least complement to host-based security services is the firewall. The firewall is inserted between the premises network and the Internet to establish a controlled link and to erect an outer security wall or perimeter. The aim of this perimeter is to protect the premises network from Internet-based attacks and to provide a single choke point where security and auditing can be imposed. The firewall may be a single computer system or a set of two or more systems that cooperate to perform the firewall function.

The firewall, then, provides an additional layer of defense, insulating the internal systems from external networks. This follows the classic military doctrine of “defense in depth,” which is just as applicable to IT security.

### 22.2 FIREWALL CHARACTERISTICS

[BELL94b] lists the following design goals for a firewall:

1. All traffic from inside to outside, and vice versa, must pass through the firewall. This is achieved by physically blocking all access to the local network except via the firewall. Various configurations are possible, as explained later in this chapter.
2. Only authorized traffic, as defined by the local security policy, will be allowed to pass. Various types of firewalls are used, which implement various types of security policies, as explained later in this chapter.
3. The firewall itself is immune to penetration. This implies the use of a hardened system with a secured operating system. Trusted computer systems are suitable for hosting a firewall and often required in government applications.

[SMIT97] lists four general techniques that firewalls use to control access and enforce the site’s security policy. Originally, firewalls focused primarily on service control, but they have since evolved to provide all four:

- **Service control**: Determines the types of Internet services that can be accessed, inbound or outbound. The firewall may filter traffic on the basis of IP address, protocol, or port number; may provide proxy software that receives and interprets each service request before passing it on; or may host the server software itself, such as a Web or mail service.
- **Direction control**: Determines the direction in which particular service requests may be initiated and allowed to flow through the firewall.
• **User control:** Controls access to a service according to which user is attempting to access it. This feature is typically applied to users inside the firewall perimeter (local users). It may also be applied to incoming traffic from external users; the latter requires some form of secure authentication technology, such as is provided in IPsec (Chapter 19).

• **Behavior control:** Controls how particular services are used. For example, the firewall may filter e-mail to eliminate spam, or it may enable external access to only a portion of the information on a local Web server.

Before proceeding to the details of firewall types and configurations, it is best to summarize what one can expect from a firewall. The following capabilities are within the scope of a firewall:

1. A firewall defines a single choke point that keeps unauthorized users out of the protected network, prohibits potentially vulnerable services from entering or leaving the network, and provides protection from various kinds of IP spoofing and routing attacks. The use of a single choke point simplifies security management because security capabilities are consolidated on a single system or set of systems.

2. A firewall provides a location for monitoring security-related events. Audits and alarms can be implemented on the firewall system.

3. A firewall is a convenient platform for several Internet functions that are not security related. These include a network address translator, which maps local addresses to Internet addresses, and a network management function that audits or logs Internet usage.

4. A firewall can serve as the platform for IPsec. Using the tunnel mode capability described in Chapter 19, the firewall can be used to implement virtual private networks.

Firewalls have their limitations, including the following:

1. The firewall cannot protect against attacks that bypass the firewall. Internal systems may have dial-out capability to connect to an ISP. An internal LAN may support a modem pool that provides dial-in capability for traveling employees and telecommuters.

2. The firewall may not protect fully against internal threats, such as a disgruntled employee or an employee who unwittingly cooperates with an external attacker.

3. An improperly secured wireless LAN may be accessed from outside the organization. An internal firewall that separates portions of an enterprise network cannot guard against wireless communications between local systems on different sides of the internal firewall.

4. A laptop, PDA, or portable storage device may be used and infected outside the corporate network, and then attached and used internally.
22.3 TYPES OF FIREWALLS

A firewall may act as a packet filter. It can operate as a positive filter, allowing to pass only packets that meet specific criteria, or as a negative filter, rejecting any packet that meets certain criteria. Depending on the type of firewall, it may examine one or more protocol headers in each packet, the payload of each packet, or the pattern generated by a sequence of packets. In this section, we look at the principal types of firewalls.

Packet Filtering Firewall

A packet filtering firewall applies a set of rules to each incoming and outgoing IP packet and then forwards or discards the packet (Figure 22.1b). The firewall is typically configured to filter packets going in both directions (from and to the internal network). Filtering rules are based on information contained in a network packet:

- **Source IP address**: The IP address of the system that originated the IP packet (e.g., 192.178.1.1)
- **Destination IP address**: The IP address of the system the IP packet is trying to reach (e.g., 192.168.1.2)
- **Source and destination transport-level address**: The transport-level (e.g., TCP or UDP) port number, which defines applications such as SNMP or TELNET
- **IP protocol field**: Defines the transport protocol
- **Interface**: For a firewall with three or more ports, which interface of the firewall the packet came from or which interface of the firewall the packet is destined for

The packet filter is typically set up as a list of rules based on matches to fields in the IP or TCP header. If there is a match to one of the rules, that rule is invoked to determine whether to forward or discard the packet. If there is no match to any rule, then a default action is taken. Two default policies are possible:

- **Default = discard**: That which is not expressly permitted is prohibited.
- **Default = forward**: That which is not expressly prohibited is permitted.

The default discard policy is more conservative. Initially, everything is blocked, and services must be added on a case-by-case basis. This policy is more visible to users, who are more likely to see the firewall as a hindrance. However, this is the policy likely to be preferred by businesses and government organizations. Further, visibility to users diminishes as rules are created. The default forward policy increases ease of use for end users but provides reduced security; the security administrator must, in essence, react to each new security threat as it becomes known. This policy may be used by generally more open organizations, such as universities.

Table 22.1, from [BELL94b], gives some examples of packet filtering rulesets. In each set, the rules are applied top to bottom. The "*" in a field is a wildcard
External (untrusted) network (e.g., Internet)

Internal (protected) network (e.g., enterprise network)

(a) General model

(b) Packet filtering firewall

(c) Stateful inspection firewall

(d) Application proxy firewall

(e) Circuit-level proxy firewall

Figure 22.1 Types of Firewalls
22.3 / TYPES OF FIREWALLS 22-7

Table 22.1  Packet-Filtering Examples

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rule Set A</th>
<th>action</th>
<th>ourhost</th>
<th>port</th>
<th>theirhost</th>
<th>port</th>
<th>comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>block</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>SPIGOT</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td>we don’t trust these people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>allow</td>
<td>OUR-GW</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td>connection to our SMTP port</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rule Set B</th>
<th>action</th>
<th>ourhost</th>
<th>port</th>
<th>theirhost</th>
<th>port</th>
<th>comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>block</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td>default</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rule Set C</th>
<th>action</th>
<th>ourhost</th>
<th>port</th>
<th>theirhost</th>
<th>port</th>
<th>comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>allow</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
<td>connection to their SMTP port</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rule Set D</th>
<th>action</th>
<th>src</th>
<th>port</th>
<th>dest</th>
<th>port</th>
<th>flags</th>
<th>comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>allow</td>
<td>[our hosts]</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>our packets to their SMTP port</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>allow</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>ACK</td>
<td></td>
<td>their replies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rule Set E</th>
<th>action</th>
<th>src</th>
<th>port</th>
<th>dest</th>
<th>port</th>
<th>flags</th>
<th>comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>allow</td>
<td>[our hosts]</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>our outgoing calls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>allow</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>ACK</td>
<td>replies to our calls</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>allow</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>&gt;1024</td>
<td></td>
<td>traffic to nonservers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

designator that matches everything. We assume that the default = discard policy is in force.

A. Inbound mail is allowed (port 25 is for SMTP incoming), but only to a gateway host. However, packets from a particular external host, SPIGOT, are blocked because that host has a history of sending massive files in e-mail messages.

B. This is an explicit statement of the default policy. All rulesets include this rule implicitly as the last rule.

C. This ruleset is intended to specify that any inside host can send mail to the outside. A TCP packet with a destination port of 25 is routed to the SMTP server on the destination machine. The problem with this rule is that the use of port 25 for SMTP receipt is only a default; an outside machine could be configured to have some other application linked to port 25. As this rule is written, an attacker could gain access to internal machines by sending packets with a TCP source port number of 25.

D. This ruleset achieves the intended result that was not achieved in C. The rules take advantage of a feature of TCP connections. Once a connection is set up, the ACK flag of a TCP segment is set to acknowledge segments sent from the other side. Thus, this ruleset states that it allows IP packets where the source IP address
is one of a list of designated internal hosts and the destination TCP port number is 25. It also allows incoming packets with a source port number of 25 that include the ACK flag in the TCP segment. Note that we explicitly designate source and destination systems to define these rules explicitly.

E. This ruleset is one approach to handling FTP connections. With FTP, two TCP connections are used: a control connection to set up the file transfer and a data connection for the actual file transfer. The data connection uses a different port number that is dynamically assigned for the transfer. Most servers, and hence most attack targets, use low-numbered ports; most outgoing calls tend to use a higher-numbered port, typically above 1023. Thus, this ruleset allows

— Packets that originate internally
— Reply packets to a connection initiated by an internal machine
— Packets destined for a high-numbered port on an internal machine

This scheme requires that the systems be configured so that only the appropriate port numbers are in use.

Rule set E points out the difficulty in dealing with applications at the packet-filtering level. Another way to deal with FTP and similar applications is either stateful packet filters or an application-level gateway, both described subsequently in this section.

One advantage of a packet filtering firewall is its simplicity. Also, packet filters typically are transparent to users and are very fast. [WACK02] lists the following weaknesses of packet filter firewalls:

- Because packet filter firewalls do not examine upper-layer data, they cannot prevent attacks that employ application-specific vulnerabilities or functions. For example, a packet filter firewall cannot block specific application commands; if a packet filter firewall allows a given application, all functions available within that application will be permitted.
- Because of the limited information available to the firewall, the logging functionality present in packet filter firewalls is limited. Packet filter logs normally contain the same information used to make access control decisions (source address, destination address, and traffic type).
- Most packet filter firewalls do not support advanced user authentication schemes. Once again, this limitation is mostly due to the lack of upper-layer functionality by the firewall.
- Packet filter firewalls are generally vulnerable to attacks and exploits that take advantage of problems within the TCP/IP specification and protocol stack, such as network layer address spoofing. Many packet filter firewalls cannot detect a network packet in which the OSI Layer 3 addressing information has been altered. Spoofing attacks are generally employed by intruders to bypass the security controls implemented in a firewall platform.
- Finally, due to the small number of variables used in access control decisions, packet filter firewalls are susceptible to security breaches caused by improper configurations. In other words, it is easy to accidentally configure a packet
filter firewall to allow traffic types, sources, and destinations that should be denied based on an organization’s information security policy.

Some of the attacks that can be made on packet filtering firewalls and the appropriate countermeasures are the following:

- **IP address spoofing:** The intruder transmits packets from the outside with a source IP address field containing an address of an internal host. The attacker hopes that the use of a spoofed address will allow penetration of systems that employ simple source address security, in which packets from specific trusted internal hosts are accepted. The countermeasure is to discard packets with an inside source address if the packet arrives on an external interface. In fact, this countermeasure is often implemented at the router external to the firewall.

- **Source routing attacks:** The source station specifies the route that a packet should take as it crosses the Internet, in the hopes that this will bypass security measures that do not analyze the source routing information. The countermeasure is to discard all packets that use this option.

- **Tiny fragment attacks:** The intruder uses the IP fragmentation option to create extremely small fragments and force the TCP header information into a separate packet fragment. This attack is designed to circumvent filtering rules that depend on TCP header information. Typically, a packet filter will make a filtering decision on the first fragment of a packet. All subsequent fragments of that packet are filtered out solely on the basis that they are part of the packet whose first fragment was rejected. The attacker hopes that the filtering firewall examines only the first fragment and that the remaining fragments are passed through. A tiny fragment attack can be defeated by enforcing a rule that the first fragment of a packet must contain a predefined minimum amount of the transport header. If the first fragment is rejected, the filter can remember the packet and discard all subsequent fragments.

### Stateful Inspection Firewalls

A traditional packet filter makes filtering decisions on an individual packet basis and does not take into consideration any higher layer context. To understand what is meant by *context* and why a traditional packet filter is limited with regard to context, a little background is needed. Most standardized applications that run on top of TCP follow a client/server model. For example, for the Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP), e-mail is transmitted from a client system to a server system. The client system generates new e-mail messages, typically from user input. The server system accepts incoming e-mail messages and places them in the appropriate user mailboxes. SMTP operates by setting up a TCP connection between client and server, in which the TCP server port number, which identifies the SMTP server application, is 25. The TCP port number for the SMTP client is a number between 1024 and 65535 that is generated by the SMTP client.

In general, when an application that uses TCP creates a session with a remote host, it creates a TCP connection in which the TCP port number for the remote (server) application is a number less than 1024 and the TCP port number for the local
A simple packet filtering firewall must permit inbound network traffic on all these high-numbered ports for TCP-based traffic to occur. This creates a vulnerability that can be exploited by unauthorized users.

A stateful inspection packet firewall tightens up the rules for TCP traffic by creating a directory of outbound TCP connections, as shown in Table 22.2. There is an entry for each currently established connection. The packet filter will now allow incoming traffic to high-numbered ports only for those packets that fit the profile of one of the entries in this directory.

A stateful packet inspection firewall reviews the same packet information as a packet filtering firewall, but also records information about TCP connections (Figure 22.1c). Some stateful firewalls also keep track of TCP sequence numbers to prevent attacks that depend on the sequence number, such as session hijacking. Some even inspect limited amounts of application data for some well-known protocols like FTP, IM and SIPS commands, in order to identify and track related connections.

**Application-Level Gateway**

An application-level gateway, also called an application proxy, acts as a relay of application-level traffic (Figure 22.1d). The user contacts the gateway using a TCP/IP application, such as Telnet or FTP, and the gateway asks the user for the name of the remote host to be accessed. When the user responds and provides a valid user ID and authentication information, the gateway contacts the application on the remote host and relays TCP segments containing the application data between the two endpoints. If the gateway does not implement the proxy code for a specific application, the service is not supported and cannot be forwarded across the firewall. Further, the gateway can be configured to support only specific features of

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**Table 22.2 Example Stateful Firewall Connection State Table [WACK02]**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source Address</th>
<th>Source Port</th>
<th>Destination Address</th>
<th>Destination Port</th>
<th>Connection State</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>192.168.1.100</td>
<td>1030</td>
<td>210.22.88.29</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>Established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>192.168.1.102</td>
<td>1031</td>
<td>216.32.42.123</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>Established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>192.168.1.101</td>
<td>1033</td>
<td>173.66.32.122</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>192.168.1.106</td>
<td>1035</td>
<td>177.231.32.12</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>Established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>223.43.21.231</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>192.168.1.6</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>Established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>212.22.123.32</td>
<td>2112</td>
<td>192.168.1.6</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>Established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>210.922.212.18</td>
<td>3321</td>
<td>192.168.1.6</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>Established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24.102.32.23</td>
<td>1025</td>
<td>192.168.1.6</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>Established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>223.21.22.12</td>
<td>1046</td>
<td>192.168.1.6</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>Established</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
an application that the network administrator considers acceptable while denying all other features.

Application-level gateways tend to be more secure than packet filters. Rather than trying to deal with the numerous possible combinations that are to be allowed and forbidden at the TCP and IP level, the application-level gateway need only scrutinize a few allowable applications. In addition, it is easy to log and audit all incoming traffic at the application level.

A prime disadvantage of this type of gateway is the additional processing overhead on each connection. In effect, there are two spliced connections between the end users, with the gateway at the splice point, and the gateway must examine and forward all traffic in both directions.

Circuit-Level Gateway

A fourth type of firewall is the circuit-level gateway or **circuit-level proxy** (Figure 22.1e). This can be a stand-alone system or it can be a specialized function performed by an application-level gateway for certain applications. As with an application gateway, a circuit-level gateway does not permit an end-to-end TCP connection; rather, the gateway sets up two TCP connections, one between itself and a TCP user on an inner host and one between itself and a TCP user on an outside host. Once the two connections are established, the gateway typically relays TCP segments from one connection to the other without examining the contents. The security function consists of determining which connections will be allowed.

A typical use of circuit-level gateways is a situation in which the system administrator trusts the internal users. The gateway can be configured to support application-level or proxy service on inbound connections and circuit-level functions for outbound connections. In this configuration, the gateway can incur the processing overhead of examining incoming application data for forbidden functions but does not incur that overhead on outgoing data.

An example of a circuit-level gateway implementation is the SOCKS package [KOBL92]; version 5 of SOCKS is specified in RFC 1928. The RFC defines SOCKS in the following fashion:

> The protocol described here is designed to provide a framework for client-server applications in both the TCP and UDP domains to conveniently and securely use the services of a network firewall. The protocol is conceptually a “shim-layer” between the application layer and the transport layer, and as such does not provide network-layer gateway services, such as forwarding of ICMP messages.

SOCKS consists of the following components:

- The SOCKS server, which often runs on a UNIX-based firewall. SOCKS is also implemented on Windows systems.
- The SOCKS client library, which runs on internal hosts protected by the firewall.
• SOCKS-ified versions of several standard client programs such as FTP and TELNET. The implementation of the SOCKS protocol typically involves either the recompilation or relinking of TCP-based client applications, or the use of alternate dynamically loaded libraries, to use the appropriate encapsulation routines in the SOCKS library.

When a TCP-based client wishes to establish a connection to an object that is reachable only via a firewall (such determination is left up to the implementation), it must open a TCP connection to the appropriate SOCKS port on the SOCKS server system. The SOCKS service is located on TCP port 1080. If the connection request succeeds, the client enters a negotiation for the authentication method to be used, authenticates with the chosen method, and then sends a relay request. The SOCKS server evaluates the request and either establishes the appropriate connection or denies it. UDP exchanges are handled in a similar fashion. In essence, a TCP connection is opened to authenticate a user to send and receive UDP segments, and the UDP segments are forwarded as long as the TCP connection is open.

22.4 FIREWALL BASING

It is common to base a firewall on a stand-alone machine running a common operating system, such as UNIX or Linux. Firewall functionality can also be implemented as a software module in a router or LAN switch. In this section, we look at some additional firewall basing considerations.

Bastion Host

A bastion host is a system identified by the firewall administrator as a critical strong point in the network’s security. Typically, the bastion host serves as a platform for an application-level or circuit-level gateway. Common characteristics of a bastion host are as follows:

• The bastion host hardware platform executes a secure version of its operating system, making it a hardened system.
• Only the services that the network administrator considers essential are installed on the bastion host. These could include proxy applications for DNS, FTP, HTTP, and SMTP.
• The bastion host may require additional authentication before a user is allowed access to the proxy services. In addition, each proxy service may require its own authentication before granting user access.
• Each proxy is configured to support only a subset of the standard application’s command set.
• Each proxy is configured to allow access only to specific host systems. This means that the limited command/feature set may be applied only to a subset of systems on the protected network.
Each proxy maintains detailed audit information by logging all traffic, each connection, and the duration of each connection. The audit log is an essential tool for discovering and terminating intruder attacks.

Each proxy module is a very small software package specifically designed for network security. Because of its relative simplicity, it is easier to check such modules for security flaws. For example, a typical UNIX mail application may contain over 20,000 lines of code, while a mail proxy may contain fewer than 1000.

Each proxy is independent of other proxies on the bastion host. If there is a problem with the operation of any proxy, or if a future vulnerability is discovered, it can be uninstalled without affecting the operation of the other proxy applications. Also, if the user population requires support for a new service, the network administrator can easily install the required proxy on the bastion host.

A proxy generally performs no disk access other than to read its initial configuration file. Hence, the portions of the file system containing executable code can be made read only. This makes it difficult for an intruder to install Trojan horse sniffers or other dangerous files on the bastion host.

Each proxy runs as a nonprivileged user in a private and secured directory on the bastion host.

Host-Based Firewalls

A host-based firewall is a software module used to secure an individual host. Such modules are available in many operating systems or can be provided as an add-on package. Like conventional stand-alone firewalls, host-resident firewalls filter and restrict the flow of packets. A common location for such firewalls is a server. There are several advantages to the use of a server-based or workstation-based firewall:

- Filtering rules can be tailored to the host environment. Specific corporate security policies for servers can be implemented, with different filters for servers used for different application.
- Protection is provided independent of topology. Thus both internal and external attacks must pass through the firewall.
- Used in conjunction with stand-alone firewalls, the host-based firewall provides an additional layer of protection. A new type of server can be added to the network, with its own firewall, without the necessity of altering the network firewall configuration.

Personal Firewall

A personal firewall controls the traffic between a personal computer or workstation on one side and the Internet or enterprise network on the other side. Personal firewall functionality can be used in the home environment and on corporate intranets. Typically, the personal firewall is a software module on the personal computer.
home environment with multiple computers connected to the Internet, firewall functionality can also be housed in a router that connects all of the home computers to a DSL, cable modem, or other Internet interface.

Personal firewalls are typically much less complex than either server-based firewalls or stand-alone firewalls. The primary role of the personal firewall is to deny unauthorized remote access to the computer. The firewall can also monitor outgoing activity in an attempt to detect and block worms and other malware.

An example of a personal firewall is the capability built in to the Mac OS X operating system. When the user enables the personal firewall in Mac OS X, all inbound connections are denied except for those the user explicitly permits. Figure 22.2 shows this simple interface. The list of inbound services that can be selectively reenabled, with their port numbers, includes the following:

- Personal file sharing (548, 427)
- Windows sharing (139)
- Personal Web sharing (80, 427)
- Remote login - SSH (22)
- FTP access (20-21, 1024-64535 from 20-21)
- Remote Apple events (3031)
- Printer sharing (631, 515)
- ICChat Rendezvous (5297, 5298)
- ITunes Music Sharing (3869)
- CVS (2401)
• Gnutella/Limewire (6346)
• ICQ (4000)
• IRC (194)
• MSN Messenger (6891-6900)
• Network Time (123)
• Retrospect (497)
• SMB (without netbios-445)
• Timbuktu (407)
• VNC (5900-5902)
• WebSTAR Admin (1080, 1443)

When FTP access is enabled, ports 20 and 21 on the local machine are opened for FTP; if others connect to this computer from ports 20 or 21, the ports 1024 through 64535 are open.

For increased protection, advanced firewall features are available through easy-to-configure checkboxes. Stealth mode hides the Mac on the Internet by dropping unsolicited communication packets, making it appear as though no Mac is present. UDP packets can be blocked, restricting network traffic to TCP packets only for open ports. The firewall also supports logging, an important tool for checking on unwanted activity.

22.5 FIREWALL LOCATION AND CONFIGURATIONS

As Figure 22.1a indicates, a firewall is positioned to provide a protective barrier between an external, potentially untrusted source of traffic and an internal network. With that general principle in mind, a security administrator must decide on the location and on the number of firewalls needed. In this section, we look at some common options.

DMZ Networks

Figure 22.3 suggests the most common distinction, that between an internal and an external firewall. An external firewall is placed at the edge of a local or enterprise network, just inside the boundary router that connects to the Internet or some wide area network (WAN). One or more internal firewalls protect the bulk of the enterprise network. Between these two types of firewalls are one or more networked devices in a region referred to as a DMZ (demilitarized zone) network. Systems that are externally accessible but need some protections are usually located on DMZ networks. Typically, the systems in the DMZ require or foster external connectivity, such as a corporate Web site, an e-mail server, or a DNS (domain name system) server.

The external firewall provides a measure of access control and protection for the DMZ systems consistent with their need for external connectivity. The external
firewall also provides a basic level of protection for the remainder of the enterprise network. In this type of configuration, internal firewalls serve three purposes:

1. The internal firewall adds more stringent filtering capability, compared to the external firewall, in order to protect enterprise servers and workstations from external attack.

2. The internal firewall provides two-way protection with respect to the DMZ. First, the internal firewall protects the remainder of the network from attacks launched from DMZ systems. Such attacks might originate from worms, rootkits, bots, or other malware lodged in a DMZ system. Second, an internal firewall can protect the DMZ systems from attack from the internal protected network.
3. Multiple internal firewalls can be used to protect portions of the internal network from each other. For example, firewalls can be configured so that internal servers are protected from internal workstations and vice versa. A common practice is to place the DMZ on a different network interface on the external firewall from that used to access the internal networks.

**Virtual Private Networks**

In today's distributed computing environment, the **virtual private network (VPN)** offers an attractive solution to network managers. In essence, a VPN consists of a set of computers that interconnect by means of a relatively unsecure network and that make use of encryption and special protocols to provide security. At each corporate site, workstations, servers, and databases are linked by one or more local area networks (LANs). The Internet or some other public network can be used to interconnect sites, providing a cost savings over the use of a private network and offloading the wide area network management task to the public network provider. That same public network provides an access path for telecommuters and other mobile employees to log on to corporate systems from remote sites.

But the manager faces a fundamental requirement: security. Use of a public network exposes corporate traffic to eavesdropping and provides an entry point for unauthorized users. To counter this problem, a VPN is needed. In essence, a VPN uses encryption and authentication in the lower protocol layers to provide a secure connection through an otherwise insecure network, typically the Internet. VPNs are generally cheaper than real private networks using private lines but rely on having the same encryption and authentication system at both ends. The encryption may be performed by firewall software or possibly by routers. The most common protocol mechanism used for this purpose is at the IP level and is known as IPsec.

An organization maintains LANs at dispersed locations. A logical means of implementing an IPsec is in a firewall, as shown in Figure 22.4, which essentially repeats Figure 19.1. If IPsec is implemented in a separate box behind (internal to) the firewall, then VPN traffic passing through the firewall in both directions is encrypted. In this case, the firewall is unable to perform its filtering function or other security functions, such as access control, logging, or scanning for viruses. IPsec could be implemented in the boundary router, outside the firewall. However, this device is likely to be less secure than the firewall and thus less desirable as an IPsec platform.

**Distributed Firewalls**

A distributed firewall configuration involves stand-alone firewall devices plus host-based firewalls working together under a central administrative control. Figure 22.5 suggests a distributed firewall configuration. Administrators can configure host-resident firewalls on hundreds of servers and workstations as well as configure personal firewalls on local and remote user systems. Tools let the network administrator set policies and monitor security across the entire network. These firewalls protect against internal attacks and provide protection tailored to specific machines and applications. Stand-alone firewalls provide global protection, including internal firewalls and an external firewall, as discussed previously.
With distributed firewalls, it may make sense to establish both an internal and an external DMZ. Web servers that need less protection because they have less critical information on them could be placed in an external DMZ, outside the external firewall. What protection is needed is provided by host-based firewalls on these servers.

An important aspect of a distributed firewall configuration is security monitoring. Such monitoring typically includes log aggregation and analysis, firewall statistics, and fine-grained remote monitoring of individual hosts if needed.

Summary of Firewall Locations and Topologies
We can now summarize the discussion from Sections 22.4 and 22.5 to define a spectrum of firewall locations and topologies. The following alternatives can be identified:

- **Host-resident firewall**: This category includes personal firewall software and firewall software on servers. Such firewalls can be used alone or as part of an in-depth firewall deployment.
- **Screening router**: A single router between internal and external networks with stateless or full packet filtering. This arrangement is typical for small office/home office (SOHO) applications.
• **Single bastion inline:** A single firewall device between an internal and external router (e.g., Figure 22.1a). The firewall may implement stateful filters and/or application proxies. This is the typical firewall appliance configuration for small to medium-sized organizations.
• **Single bastion T**: Similar to single bastion inline but has a third network interface on bastion to a DMZ where externally visible servers are placed. Again, this is a common appliance configuration for medium to large organizations.

• **Double bastion inline**: Figure 22.3 illustrates this configuration, where the DMZ is sandwiched between bastion firewalls. This configuration is common for large businesses and government organizations.

• **Double bastion T**: The DMZ is on a separate network interface on the bastion firewall. This configuration is also common for large businesses and government organizations and may be required. For example, this configuration is required for Australian government use (Australian Government Information Technology Security Manual - ACSI33).

• **Distributed firewall configuration**: Illustrated in Figure 22.5. This configuration is used by some large businesses and government organizations.

### 22.6 RECOMMENDED READING AND WEB SITE

A classic treatment of firewalls is [CHES03]. [LODI98], [OPPL97], and [BELL94b] are good overview articles on the subject. [WACK02] is an excellent overview of firewall technology and firewall policies. [AUDI04] and [WILS05] provide useful discussions of firewalls.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reference</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Recommended Web Site:**

- **Firewall.com**: Numerous links to firewall references and software resources.
22.7 KEY TERMS, REVIEW QUESTIONS, AND PROBLEMS

Key Terms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>application-level gateway</th>
<th>firewall</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>bastion host</td>
<td>host-based firewall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>circuit-level gateway</td>
<td>IP address spoofing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>distributed firewalls</td>
<td>IP security (IPsec)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DMZ</td>
<td>packet filtering firewall</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Review Questions

22.1 List three design goals for a firewall.
22.2 List four techniques used by firewalls to control access and enforce a security policy.
22.3 What information is used by a typical packet filtering firewall?
22.4 What are some weaknesses of a packet filtering firewall?
22.5 What is the difference between a packet filtering firewall and a stateful inspection firewall?
22.6 What is an application-level gateway?
22.7 What is a circuit-level gateway?
22.8 What are the differences among the firewalls of Figure 22.1?
22.9 What are the common characteristics of a bastion host?
22.10 Why is it useful to have host-based firewalls?
22.11 What is a DMZ network and what types of systems would you expect to find on such networks?
22.12 What is the difference between an internal and an external firewall?

Problems

22.1 As was mentioned in Section 22.3, one approach to defeating the tiny fragment attack is to enforce a minimum length of the transport header that must be contained in the first fragment of an IP packet. If the first fragment is rejected, all subsequent fragments can be rejected. However, the nature of IP is such that fragments may arrive out of order. Thus, an intermediate fragment may pass through the filter before the initial fragment is rejected. How can this situation be handled?

22.2 In an IPv4 packet, the size of the payload in the first fragment, in octets, is equal to Total Length – (4 × IHL). If this value is less than the required minimum (8 octets for TCP), then this fragment and the entire packet are rejected. Suggest an alternative method of achieving the same result using only the Fragment Offset field.

22.3 RFC 791, the IPv4 protocol specification, describes a reassembly algorithm that results in new fragments overwriting any overlapped portions of previously received fragments. Given such a reassembly implementation, an attacker could construct a series of packets in which the lowest (zero-offset) fragment would contain innocuous data (and thereby be passed by administrative packet filters), and in which some subsequent packet having a non-zero offset would overlap TCP header information (destination port, for instance) and cause it to be modified. The second packet would be passed through most filter implementations because it does not have a zero fragment offset. Suggest a method that could be used by a packet filter to counter this attack.
22-22 CHAPTER 22 / FIREWALLS

Table 22.3 Sample Packet Filter Firewall Ruleset

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source Address</th>
<th>Source Port</th>
<th>Dest Address</th>
<th>Dest Port</th>
<th>Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Any</td>
<td>192.168.1.0</td>
<td>&gt; 1023</td>
<td>Allow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>192.168.1.1</td>
<td>Any</td>
<td>Any</td>
<td>Deny</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Any</td>
<td>192.168.1.1</td>
<td>Any</td>
<td>Deny</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>192.168.1.0</td>
<td>Any</td>
<td>Any</td>
<td>Allow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Any</td>
<td>192.168.1.2</td>
<td>SMTP</td>
<td>Allow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Any</td>
<td>192.168.1.3</td>
<td>HTTP</td>
<td>Allow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Any</td>
<td>Any</td>
<td>Any</td>
<td>Deny</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

22.4 Table 22.3 shows a sample of a packet filter firewall ruleset for an imaginary network of IP address that range from 192.168.1.0 to 192.168.1.254. Describe the effect of each rule.

22.5 SMTP (Simple Mail Transfer Protocol) is the standard protocol for transferring mail between hosts over TCP. A TCP connection is set up between a user agent and a server program. The server listens on TCP port 25 for incoming connection requests. The user end of the connection is on a TCP port number above 1023. Suppose you wish to build a packet filter rule set allowing inbound and outbound SMTP traffic. You generate the following ruleset:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rule</th>
<th>Direction</th>
<th>Src Addr</th>
<th>Dest Addr</th>
<th>Protocol</th>
<th>Dest Port</th>
<th>Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>In</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>Internal</td>
<td>TCP</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Permit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Out</td>
<td>Internal</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>TCP</td>
<td>&gt;1023</td>
<td>Permit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Out</td>
<td>Internal</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>TCP</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Permit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>In</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>Internal</td>
<td>TCP</td>
<td>&gt;1023</td>
<td>Permit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>Either</td>
<td>Any</td>
<td>Any</td>
<td>Any</td>
<td>Any</td>
<td>Deny</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Describe the effect of each rule.
b. Your host in this example has IP address 172.16.1.1. Someone tries to send e-mail from a remote host with IP address 192.168.3.4. If successful, this generates an SMTP dialogue between the remote user and the SMTP server on your host consisting of SMTP commands and mail. Additionally, assume that a user on your host tries to send e-mail to the SMTP server on the remote system. Four typical packets for this scenario are as shown:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Packet</th>
<th>Direction</th>
<th>Src Addr</th>
<th>Dest Addr</th>
<th>Protocol</th>
<th>Dest Port</th>
<th>Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>In</td>
<td>192.168.3.4</td>
<td>172.16.1.1</td>
<td>TCP</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Out</td>
<td>172.16.1.1</td>
<td>192.168.3.4</td>
<td>TCP</td>
<td>1234</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Out</td>
<td>172.16.1.1</td>
<td>192.168.3.4</td>
<td>TCP</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>In</td>
<td>192.168.3.4</td>
<td>172.16.1.1</td>
<td>TCP</td>
<td>1357</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Indicate which packets are permitted or denied and which rule is used in each case.
22.7 / KEY TERMS, REVIEW QUESTIONS, AND PROBLEMS

22-23

c. Someone from the outside world (10.1.2.3) attempts to open a connection from port 5150 on a remote host to the Web proxy server on port 8080 on one of your local hosts (172.16.3.4), in order to carry out an attack. Typical packets are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Packet</th>
<th>Direction</th>
<th>Src Addr</th>
<th>Dest Addr</th>
<th>Protocol</th>
<th>Dest Port</th>
<th>Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>In</td>
<td>10.1.2.3</td>
<td>172.16.3.4</td>
<td>TCP</td>
<td>8080</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Out</td>
<td>172.16.3.4</td>
<td>10.1.2.3</td>
<td>TCP</td>
<td>5150</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Will the attack succeed? Give details.

22.6 To provide more protection, the ruleset from the preceding problem is modified as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rule</th>
<th>Direction</th>
<th>Src Addr</th>
<th>Dest Addr</th>
<th>Protocol</th>
<th>Src Port</th>
<th>Dest Port</th>
<th>Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>In</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>Internal</td>
<td>TCP</td>
<td>&gt;1023</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Permit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Out</td>
<td>Internal</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>TCP</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>&gt;1023</td>
<td>Permit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Out</td>
<td>Internal</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>TCP</td>
<td>&gt;1023</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Permit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>In</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>Internal</td>
<td>TCP</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>&gt;1023</td>
<td>Permit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>Either</td>
<td>Any</td>
<td>Any</td>
<td>Any</td>
<td>Any</td>
<td>Any</td>
<td>Deny</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Describe the change.
b. Apply this new ruleset to the same six packets of the preceding problem. Indicate which packets are permitted or denied and which rule is used in each case.

22.7 A hacker uses port 25 as the client port on his or her end to attempt to open a connection to your Web proxy server.

a. The following packets might be generated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Packet</th>
<th>Direction</th>
<th>Src Addr</th>
<th>Dest Addr</th>
<th>Protocol</th>
<th>Src Port</th>
<th>Dest Port</th>
<th>Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>In</td>
<td>10.1.2.3</td>
<td>172.16.3.4</td>
<td>TCP</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>8080</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Out</td>
<td>172.16.3.4</td>
<td>10.1.2.3</td>
<td>TCP</td>
<td>8080</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Explain why this attack will succeed, using the ruleset of the preceding problem.
b. When a TCP connection is initiated, the ACK bit in the TCP header is not set. Subsequently, all TCP headers sent over the TCP connection have the ACK bit set. Use this information to modify the ruleset of the preceding problem to prevent the attack just described.

22.8 A common management requirement is that “all external Web traffic must flow via the organization’s Web proxy.” However, that requirement is easier stated than implemented. Discuss the various problems and issues, possible solutions, and limitations with supporting this requirement. In particular consider issues such as identifying exactly what constitutes “Web traffic” and how it may be monitored, given the large range of ports and various protocols used by Web browsers and servers.

22.9 Consider the threat of “theft/breach of proprietary or confidential information held in key data files on the system.” One method by which such a breach might occur is the accidental/deliberate e-mailing of information to a user outside to the organization. A possible countermeasure to this is to require all external e-mail to be given a
sensitivity tag (classification if you like) in its subject and for external e-mail to have the lowest sensitivity tag. Discuss how this measure could be implemented in a firewall and what components and architecture would be needed to do this.

22.10 You are given the following “informal firewall policy” details to be implemented using a firewall like that in Figure 22.3:

1. E-mail may be sent using SMTP in both directions through the firewall, but it must be relayed via the DMZ mail gateway that provides header sanitization and content filtering. External e-mail must be destined for the DMZ mail server.
2. Users inside may retrieve their e-mail from the DMZ mail gateway, using either POP3 or POP3S, and authenticate themselves.
3. Users outside may retrieve their e-mail from the DMZ mail gateway, but only if they use the secure POP3 protocol, and authenticate themselves.
4. Web requests (both insecure and secure) are allowed from any internal user out through the firewall but must be relayed via the DMZ Web proxy, which provides content filtering (noting this is not possible for secure requests), and users must authenticate with the proxy for logging.
5. Web requests (both insecure and secure) are allowed from anywhere on the Internet to the DMZ Web server.
6. DNS lookup requests by internal users allowed via the DMZ DNS server, which queries to the Internet.
7. External DNS requests are provided by the DMZ DNS server.
8. Management and update of information on the DMZ servers is allowed using secure shell connections from relevant authorized internal users (may have different sets of users on each system as appropriate).
9. SNMP management requests are permitted from the internal management hosts to the firewalls, with the firewalls also allowed to send management traps (i.e., notification of some event occurring) to the management hosts.

Design suitable packet filter rulesets (similar to those shown in Table 22.1) to be implemented on the “External Firewall” and the “Internal Firewall” to satisfy the aforementioned policy requirements.